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HEAVY METAL ALLOYS:
UNSIGNED ROCK BANDS AND JOINT WORK
MICHAEL S. YOUNG*
INTRODUCTION: THIS IS MY SONG1
In the early stages of forming a rock band, it is common for almost
every aspect of the group's existence to remain in mercurial flux. Members
come and go, musicians may experiment with several different musical
styles and, perhaps most importantly, the power structure changes. The
volatile environment often means that the creative process between mem-
bers of forming bands can become quite unorthodox, and in the process,
collaborators often fail to reach clear agreements about what rights arise
from each member's contributions. When a song defies the expectations of
its creators by attaining popularity, soured relationships and litigation are
likely to follow.
This article explores the current topography of the ever-changing legal
terrain upstart musicians must navigate when asserting a right in a "joint
work" about which there is no explicit agreement. Part I presents a story-
culled partly from the biographies of some of heavy metal'S2 most success-
ful bands, as well as the author's own experiences-illustrating a common
creative environment for rock stars in the making. Part II offers a brief
bird's eye view of copyright, generally, and joint work, specifically, to
orient readers to the topic matter. Analysis turns in Part III to a cross-
jurisdictional survey of the element at the heart of most joint authorship
disputes-shared intent of putative coauthors. Part IV continues in the
same fashion by examining the evolution of court-imposed requirements as
to the type and amount of a contribution one must make in order to be an
author. Part V presents a critique of the deficits of the current modus ope-
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall) School of Law.
This note also owes its existence to Professors Henry Perritt and Elizabeth DeArmond, of Chicago-Kent
College of Law, for their wise counsel and encouragement.
1. SCORPIONS, This is My Song, on FLY TO THE RAINBOW (RCA 1974). The first album recorded
by Scorpions with legendary lead guitarist Ulrich "Uli Jon" Roth, following the departure of Michael
Schenker, another of metal's most revered lead guitarists.
2. Many styles of music would have sufficed for the purpose of this illustration. Heavy metal was
chosen solely because of the author's enduring affection for the classic era of heavy metal as a musical
style and cultural movement.
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randi of the federal courts with regard to joint authorship and offers some
suggestions for enhancing fairness and responsiveness to the creative reali-
ty underlying many joint works.
I. QUEST FOR FIRE: 3 BAY AREA THRASH4 CRASH LANDS IN QUEENS
As the heavy metal scene withered around them in the winter of 1993,
Pete Dominici, a guitarist known for unleashing hellish fury on a Flying
V, 5 and Earl "Skinz" Mahoney, a singer with the voice of a psychotic ban-
shee, refused to accept reality. When a representative from a small record
label invited them to New York, so that "maybe something could work
out," 6 the pair ditched their flat in El Cerrito and hopped a bus for the Big
3. IRON MAIDEN, Quest for Fire, on PIECE OF MIND (EMI 1983). The group's fourth studio
album, it was second record to feature lead singer Bruce Dickinson and the first to feature former Trust
drummer Nicko McBrain, both of whom remain active members of the band today. The album's lead
single, "The Trooper," recounts events of the Crimean War.
4. "Thrash" is a subgenre of heavy metal originating in the San Francisco Bay Area circa 1982
and heavily influenced by the musical complexity of so-called "New Wave of British Heavy Metal"
(NWOBHM) bands (such as Diamond Head, Savage, and Iron Maiden) blended with the raw speed and
attitude of 1970s punk rock (the Misfits and the Sex Pistols in particular). GARY SHARPE-YOUNG,
METAL: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 90 (Joel Melver ed., 2007). Successful thrash bands include Anthrax,
Exodus, Megadeth, and Slayer. Metallica, the most popular group to emerge from the thrash movement,
has won eight Grammy Awards and in 2008 broke a four-way tie with The Beatles, U2, and Dave
Matthews Band to become the only band in history to debut five consecutive albums at #1 on the Bill-
board Top 200.. Ben Sisario, Metallica Tops Charts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9502EID81039F93BA2575ACOA96E9C8B63. Metal-
lica is currently the fifth largest selling act in history. Edna Gunderson, Eminem Has All the Moves,
USA TODAY, Jan. 6, 2011 at 2d.
5. A guitar produced by Gibson originally in 1958, named for its "V" shaped body. Discontinued
only a year later because its advanced design did not appeal to consumers, the instrument enjoyed a
revival when blues player Albert King took to it, followed by Jimi Hendrix. The "V" was reissued in
1967, and throughout the 1970s became primarily associated with heavy metal, thanks to players like
K.K. Downing of Judas Priest and Michael Schenker of Scorpions and UFO. The design is now a
permanent part of the Gibson line and has been duplicated by numerous other manufacturers. See
ZACHARY FJESTAD & LARRY MEINERS, THE GIBSON FLYING V 7, 9, I1, 23, 28, 53, 102 (Blue Book
2007).
6. For the purpose of this note, assume a court would not find that the "work for hire" doctrine
applies.
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Apple. Dominici planned to write an album based on Norse mythology,7 so
he convinced Skinz the band should be called Mjallnir's 8 Wrath.
The guys slept in the Astoria bus station for two nights until Eddy Da-
dashian, the record label representative, arrived and drove them to a dingy,
cold warehouse in South Jamaica, Queens. 9 The next morning, Pete got a
job at a convenience store and received an advance of a dozen packets of
lunchmeat.10 Skinz contributed by donating blood for booze money and
finding a functioning TV in a nearby dumpster.
Near dusk, Eddy showed up with a drum kit, a guitar amp, a four track
audio recorder, and two more stumbling-drunk 23-year-olds: Bjorn Hag-
lund and Walter Cristo. Haglund was well known as a drummer in his na-
tive Sweden, but had not played a single gig since moving to New York.
Cristo, a classical pianist from El Paso, had recently turned to playing bass
and listening to metal. Both spent more time with mind-altering chemicals
than with their music.
The now-complete Mj6llnir's Wrath fell into a steady rhythm. Skinz
slept by his TV, rousing only to drink. Haglund panhandled and com-
plained. Cristo argued with his long-distance girlfriend over a payphone.
Dominici, however, began to write and record guitar riffs in the early
mornings before his shifts at the convenience store. The riffs were not
complete songs, just short cacophonies of galloping guitar mini-assaults, all
in the same key and tempo. They were not groundbreaking, but were not
identical to any existing work.
7. Not a particularly fresh theme for heavy metal music. Early metal bands like Manowar pio-
neered the use of Norse mythology in heavy metal lyrics, and the fascination with Scandinavian lore
continues to this day, the torch having been passed to thrash-revival bands like Canadian quartet 3
Inches of Blood. "Viking Metal" is now even considered a sub-genre of metal; it is typified by bands
such as Amon Amarth, Bathory, and Enslaved. The convergence of Norse legends and heavy metal is
also highlighted to glorious and often hilarious effect in the 2009 video game release Brutal Legend, in
which the central character navigates a fantasy world inspired by Viking myths and heavy metal album
artwork, slaying enemies using an electric Flying V guitar. Seth Scheisel, Where Metal, in Its Infinite
Variety, Reigns, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19 2009, at Cl.
8. Pronounced "my81'nir." Mjollnir is the name of hammer belonging to Thor, the Norse god of
thunder. It was made for him by dwarves. See DAVID LEEMING, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WORLD
MYTHOLOGY 266-67 (2005).
9. Not unlike "The Music Building," where Metallica and Anthrax lived and rehearsed while
recording their respective debut albums. Metallica guitarist Kirk Hammett described the experience: "I
found a piece of foam on the ground, and I used that as my mattress. . .I remember washing my hair in
the sink using cold water, it was brutal. . Anthrax was really nice and helped us out a lot. They gave us
a fridge and a toaster oven." VH1 Behind The Music: Anthrax (VHI television broadcast Mar. 10,
2002); see JOEL MCIVER, JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE TRUTH ABOUT METALLICA 106-07 (2004).
10. The sole ingredient of "loser's lunch," a term coined for the bologna-on-hand sandwich that
sustained Metallica during their stay in New York while recording their debut record, Kill 'Em All. VH1
Behind The Music: Anthrax (VH1 television broadcast Mar. 10, 2002).
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Tensions began to rise. By the middle of the third week, Dominici de-
cided to abandon ship. "I'm gonna go start an alt-rockl band with some
actual musicians, instead a bunch of lazy, self-absorbed drunks!" he
shouted. He stormed out to catch the next bus to Seattle, leaving behind the
tapes containing his riffs.
When Eddy learned that Dominici had split, he was not pleased. "This
is not your dime, guys," he told the remnants of the band. "You have 48
hours to put something together or we're going to have a problem."
Cristo took the lead. "Eddy scares me; let's just toss something to-
gether and get out of here." Cristo knew his way around a four-track re-
corder; he cut and pasted pieces of tape so Dominici's riffs sounded
coherent together. The end result was a five-minute "guitar doodle." He
then plugged in his bass and recorded a bass line, simply doubling the root
notes of Dominici's guitar chords.
Getting the drums on tape proved to be time consuming. Haglund was
morbidly hung over; after several false starts, he laid down an uninspired,
sloppy beat over the riffs.
Cristo then realized Skinz would never be able to perform vocals so-
ber; after plying him with liquor, Cristo propped him up in front of a mi-
crophone. "Just do what comes naturally," he said. Skinz promptly dropped
trou and tied a blanket around his neck. "I meant vocally. Okay, remember,
the plan was to do songs about the Norse gods." Skinz gestured boldly and
fell down, shouting incoherently. Cristo pressed the record button. Among
the lyrical jewels he recorded were:
"Loki doesn't wear no pants!
He took my cigarettes and my bike pump!
Where's my hands, chicken?
To Serve Man ... it's a cook book!"' 2
Cristo played the song back for the other two. Skinz fell asleep about a
minute in, but Haglund listened attentively through his alcoholic haze. "It's
still awful," he said. "You need a quiet section before each chorus. Just
11. Alternative rock, a style of rock originating in Seattle circa 1989, is characterized by intros-
pective lyrics and an eschewing of the technical prowess commonly associated with metal. Thomas
Harrison, "Empire": Chart Performance of Heavy Metal Groups, 1991-1992, 30 POP. MuSic & SOC.
197, 199 (2007).. The sudden mainstream popularity of alternative rock is often credited with signaling
the end of heavy metal, but the genre's popularity has in fact endured rather well. See id. at 198 (heavy
metal/hard rock occupied one of the top two positions in the Billboard 200 for all but three years be-
tween 1990 and 2007).
12. The Twilight Zone: To Serve Man (CBS broadcast March 2, 1962). The title of this episode,
based on a 1950 short story by Damon Knight, is a play on the double meaning of the work "serve" in
English. In the episode, humans translating an alien text entitled "To Serve Man" learn much too late
that it is not a manual on philanthropy, but a collection of recipes.
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drums and bass. Then it can go back into that heavy thing. And why can't
you take the 'Loki doesn't wear no pants' line and like loop it four times to
make the chorus sound right? It's a complete mess right now; you can't tell
where anything starts or ends."
"Anything else?" Cristo asked, hoping his Swedish critic would note
the sarcasm.
"Yeah! Your bass playing stinks! You're just copying the guitar;
that's not metal!" Haglund proceeded to sing along to the tape, his voice
moving in harmony (thirds) with the existing bass line. "Like that! Fix it!"
he insisted.
Cristo was annoyed by Haglund's overbearing critique, but decided to
give the ideas a shot anyway. He re-recorded the bass line employing a
harmony line similar to the one Haglund had sung, making slight altera-
tions using the Baroque counterpoint theoryl 3 he had picked up before
dropping out of music school at Baylor.
Cristo agreed that the result was superior and decided to try out Hag-
lund's other ideas as well. The repetition of the Loki phrase could work for
a chorus, and some kind of drum/bass pre-chorus might break up the mono-
tony. Cristo worked through the tedium of fixing the timing of Haglund's
drumming and copied the Loki line and pasted it four times over each of
the choruses. Around midnight, he took out the tape, scribbled "Mjallnir's
Wrath" on it in marker, and played it again for Haglund, who liked it. "I
have an idea," Haglund suggested. "We'll keep the Norse theme. Let's call
it 'Kicking Asgard!' for my Viking ancestors." Cristo chuckled.
Eddy arrived at about two in the morning, and they played the tape for
him. As Eddy listened, a smile crept across his face. "It's so bad, it's al-
most good. .. but I don't think I can use it. We're not making any money
off metal right now; the whole label is going 'alt rock.' Now clear out so
we can use the space."
Before they left that night, Haglund told Cristo he wanted to keep the
tape. "I don't care," Cristo told him. "But if you do anything with it, just
make sure to let people know I worked on it too."
Haglund just laughed, saying, "That won't be an issue."
That night was the last any of the members of Mj6llnir's Wrath ever
saw one another. Pete Dominici formed a grunge band in Washington, but
moved back to New York in 2003, where he channeled his anger into in-
13. Technically speaking, counterpoint is not harmony; rather, baroque counterpoint involves
crafting two independent melodies-that the simultaneously occurring notes produce "harmonies" is
inevitable but incidental. 6 NEw GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS 551 (Stanley Sadie
ed., 2nd ed. 2001).
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sulting customers at an espresso shop. Walter Cristo moved to Chicago and
played bass for a jazz combo, spending all his money in riverboat casinos.
Earl "Skinz" Mahoney suffered a terminal cardiac arrest at his parents'
house in Sparks, Nevada in 2002. Haglund fared better; he wound up in
Los Angeles, co-producing a sketch comedy television program.
One afternoon, as Haglund was pitching ideas for the show, he re-
membered that he still had the recording of "Kicking Asgard." He played it
for the other producers, who loved it. That week, the show's writers penned
a scene featuring a band called Mjallnir's Wrath performing a re-recorded
version of "Kicking Asgard," also mentioned by name in the sketch.14
The sketch aired the following Saturday night and became an instant
hit. The sketch was credited for saving the embattled show, which was
promptly renewed for another season. Soon, Pete Dominici, Walt Cristo,
and relatives of Earl "Skinz" Mahoney heard it, and each retained lawyers
who began to research the laws of the various jurisdictions where suits
might be filed.
II. CRASH COURSE IN BRAIN SURGERY' 5 : A JOINT COPYRIGHT PRIMER
The specific rights of copyright holders are spelled out in the Copy-
right Act, 16 but the Constitution itself authorizes Congress to afford crea-
tors such protections.' 7 The founders recognized that America's long-term
economic prosperity and advancement was dependent on promoting "the
progress of science and useful arts,"' 8 which necessitates securing exclu-
sive rights to creators. The rights to which copyright owners may lay exclu-
sive claim are reproduction, adaptation, distribution, display, performance,
and in the case of sound recordings, public performance by means of digital
audio transmission.19
14. Because fair use is not the focus of this note, assume that a court would find that a fair use
defense against infringement could succeed on these facts, due to the commercial nature of the use and
the fact the song was used in its entirety. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). It is also assumed that the re-
recorded version is identical to the original in arrangement, so that the question is not one of an implied
license to create derivative work, but rather actual infringement of the performance right in the original
song.
15. BUDGIE, Crash Course in Brain Surgery, on BUDGIE (Kapp 1971). This groundbreaking
Welsh group influenced a number of successful American thrash bands, but never attained massive
popularity, possibly due to peculiar song titles including Nude Disintegrating Parachute Woman and
Hot as a Docker's Armpit. GARY SHARPE-YOUNG, METAL: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 30 (Joel McIver
ed., 2007).
16. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2006)
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
18. Id.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006)
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A. The Subject Matter of Copyright
In order for a work to be copyrightable, it must be a work of author-
ship, it must be fixed in a tangible medium, and it must be original.20 Au-
thorship, by itself, only requires that the creation "owe its origin" to the
maker.21 Authorship has tended not to be as highly contentious in in-
fringement cases brought in regard to putative joint works as the other ele-
ments of copyrightability, especially the originality requirement. This is
because authorship and originality dovetail- "a work is not the product of
an author unless it is original."22
The fixation requirement limits the Act's applicability to expressions
of ideas in tangible form rather than the ideas themselves. Courts have
treated this as a Constitutional mandate, because in order to "promote the
progress of science and useful arts,"23 ideas must be recorded. That no
copyright subsists in the mere narration of ideas is "the most fundamental
axiom of copyright law." 24 Simply making a suggestion that ultimately
becomes part of the work is not adequate fixation.25
Originality, finally, is a Constitutional requirement-"the sine qua
non of copyright . .. [the] touchstone." 26 The originality requirement is the
focus of the lion's share of contention; no shortage of disputes over copy-
rightability has turned exclusively on this element. 27 But despite its exalted
role in the determination of copyrightability, the bar for originality "is set
extremely low." 28 Accordingly, "a work may be original even though it
closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the
result of copying." 29
20. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (2006) (declaring that the Copyright Act extends copyright protection only
to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression").
21. Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (quoting Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53, 58 (1884)).
22. Id at 352 (1991) (quoting I M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, NimmerON COPYRIGHT § 2.01).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.24.Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
24. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 556
(1985).
25. See Maurizio v. Goldsmith, 84 F. Supp. 2d 455, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
26. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-46.
27. E.g. Id. at 365 (noting that where one publisher of a telephone directory produced a volume in
which it merely copied many of its records from another publisher, its final product was not copyrighta-
ble because it lacked the element of originality).
28. Id. at 345.
29. Id.
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B. Co-ownership of a Copyright
Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a joint work as one "pre-
pared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 30 A
strictly literal interpretation arguably requires only a showing that two or
more authors made contributions, and that they intended that the contribu-
tions be merged into a unitary whole, in order to find that a work has been
authored jointly. However, each of the circuit courts of appeals discussed in
this article has refused that interpretation and has imposed different stan-
dards.
The Second Circuit, for example, has held that to require only intent to
merge contributions would be an inadequate standard, as it may unjustly
reward either persons who do not make a substantial contribution to the
work, or persons who are attempting to defy the will of an intended sole
author by bootstrapping their way into authorship. 31 The court has instead
interpreted the statute to require 1) that putative authors make contributions
that are independently copyrightable and greater than de minimis in nature,
and 2) mutual intent that rests not on whether contributors intended to
merge respective contributions into a single whole, but rather on "how the
putative joint authors regarded themselves in relation to the work."32
The Seventh Circuit has in many respects adopted the Second Cir-
cuit's elevation of the applicable standard from one requiring only intent to
merge contributions. 33 The court essentially applies the same two basic
requirements for a showing of joint authorship: 1) only one who has made
an independently copyrightable contribution may claim authorship, and 2)
the putative coauthors must intend not only that their contributions be
merged, but that they intend to be coauthors of a joint work.34 The Seventh
Circuit has distinguished itself from other circuits most notably by recently
crafting an exception to the requirement that all coauthors must make inde-
pendently copyrightable contributions. 35
30. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
31. See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing and approving the court's
reasoning in Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991), in which the court concluded that
limiting co-authorship analysis to the plain language of the statute "would extend joint authorship to
many persons who are not likely to be within the contemplation of Congress").
32. Childress, 945 F.2d at 508.
33. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1066, 1068-69 (7th Cir. 1994). (implicitly
approving the district judge's use of the two-part joint authorship test set forth by the Second Circuit in
Childress and expounding its strengths).
34. See id at 1068-67.
35. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2004).
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Finally the Ninth Circuit has determined that a joint work has three
basic components: 1) that the work in dispute be a copyrightable one, 2)
that there be two or more authors, and 3) that the authors intend their con-
tributions be merged into a unitary whole.36 The Ninth Circuit also applies
the "independently copyrightable" requirement to contributions, but ex-
plained it as a statutory requirement rather than a judicially imposed eleva-
tion of the statutory standard.37 Chief among the unique features of the
Ninth Circuit's analysis is that the "intent" requirement includes an inquiry
into the "audience appeal" of the putative coauthor's contribution. 38
A much more detailed exploration of the courts' approaches to copy-
right in joint musical works follows, applying the law of the several juris-
dictions to the hypothetical illustration from Part I to demonstrate the
varied approaches and their implications for collaborators.
III. MASTER OF PUPPETS:39 COLLABORATION AND DOMINATION IN JOINT
WORK "INTENT" ANALYSIS
Section 101 of the Copyright Act4o requires that coauthors form "the
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdepen-
dent parts of a unitary whole." 41 The text of the statutory definition could
easily lend itself to a lower standard, based only on the intent to contribute,
and merge contributions into a unitary whole. Nonetheless, as discussed
above, courts are in agreement that more must be required (even if they
have not always agreed on the reasons why more is required).42
For the purpose of contrasting the varying approaches of the courts to
the complex question of intent within joint work, the following section first
examines the current evidentiary tests employed by the courts in assessing
whether collaborators shared intent of a type warranting status as coau-
thors, and then turns to a more detailed discussion of the types of evidence
considered probative under those tests. The three circuit courts of appeals
in the scope of this note have enumerated lists of evidentiary categories that
are not entirely congruent with one another. To simplify the discussion,
they have been reorganized and classified below as either "subjective"
36. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1999).
37. Id at 1233.
38. Id. at 1234.
39. METALLICA, Master ofPuppets, on MASTER OF PUPPETS (Elektra 1986). The first thrash-era
metal record to break the Billboard Top 100. GARY SHARPE-YOUNG, METAL: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE
125 (Joel McIver ed., 2007).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
41. Id
42. See supra at Part II.B.
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indicia of intent or "objective" indicia of intent. The final subsection below
examines an oft-overlooked element of the courts' intent analysis-the
question of whether requisite intent must exist contemporaneously with the
act of contribution or whether intent is legally valid even when it forms
subsequent to the collaboration.
A. Choosing an Intent Test
Courts have struggled for some time to clearly enunciate the nature of
the intent that coauthors must form and share in order to create a joint
work. Though Section 101 on its face requires only the intent that "contri-
butions be merged," 43 courts have held that standard to be inadequate. In-
deed, the Second Circuit's decisions in Childress v. Taylor and Thomson v.
Larson advance an unequivocal doctrine that an approach "more stringent
than the statutory language would seem to suggest is required."44 This is
because "equal sharing of rights should be reserved for relationships in
which all participants fully intend to be joint authors." 45 The court justifies
this approach on the grounds that mechanical application of the letter of the
statute would extend joint author status to "persons who are not likely to
have been within the contemplation of Congress." 46
The Seventh Circuit has likewise framed the issue in terms of two
competing intent tests for joint authorship.It describes one requiring only
the intent to collaborate and merge contributions into a single work (which
the Seventh Circuit calls the "collaboration test") 47 and another based on
the intent to be joint authors (which it refers to as the "Childress"48 test,
referencing the landmark Second Circuit decision).49 Ultimately, the Se-
venth Circuit rejected the "collaboration alone" standard on the grounds
that it would frustrate the Copyright Act's goal of promoting the "Progress
of Science and the useful Arts," since creators would have a disincentive to
seek input from colleagues if they risked losing sole authorship.50
43. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
44. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998); see Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500,
507 (2d Cir 1991).
45. Childress, 945 F.2d at 509.
46. Id. at 507.
47. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1067 (7th Cir. 1994).
48. 945 F.2d at 500.
49. Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1067.
50. Id. at 1068-69. The author humbly submits that the Seventh Circuit was less transparent in its
interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 101 than was the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit openly declared that
a strict literal reading of the statute was inadequate as a standard because it would distribute the reward
of authorship too broadly. See Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200. The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand,
asserts that "the statute itself requires that there be an intent to create a joint work." Erickson, 13 F.3d at
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The Ninth Circuit has approached the issue somewhat differently, see-
ing the "intent" question as merely a guidepost for reaching the ultimate
question of authorship.5' Steered more by the use of the word "author" in
Section 101 than by the word "intent," the court nonetheless reaches the
same conclusion that the so-called "collaboration alone" test would be il-
logical to apply because if intending to make a creative contribution to a
work was adequate to demonstrate authorship, "so many people might
qualify as an 'author'. . . that that test would not distinguish one from
another." 52
In light of these concerns that a standard requiring only intent to con-
tribute and see the contributions merged into a unitary whole would reward
undeserving individuals, discourage collaboration, and undermine the con-
cept of authorship, the courts have each adopted overlapping (though not
congruent) means of finding the "intention" required by Section 101.
In the Second Circuit, it is the "intent of both participants in the ven-
ture to regard themselves as joint authors" that controls, not merely that
they intend to merge respective contributions into a unitary whole. 53 The
court's approach thus authorizes a broad inquiry into both the subjective
and objective indicia of intent, including what decision-making authority or
control each contributor exercised, billing or listing of credits, written
agreements with third parties, whether the parties demonstrated any under-
standing of the distinguishing characteristics of the joint author relation-
ship, and a catch-all category considering any additional evidence of
conduct consistent with intent. 54 Finally, the court has held that the 1976
Copyright Act's legislative history requires that the intent must have
formed "at the time the writing is done." 55
1068. The court frames two possible interpretations of the statutory language: one requiring intent to
collaborate and one requiring intent to create joint work, and then selects the latter. Neither follows the
grammatical construction of Section 101, where the "intention" attaches to the act of merging, not to the
collaboration alone, nor the nomenclature of the final work as either "sole" or "joint."
51. See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1999) (framing its analysis of
intent in terms of the legal standards of "authorship," and acknowledging that this approach, while
different than that of the Second and Seventh Circuits, mandates the same result-rejection of any test
resembling the "collaboration alone" standard).
52. Id. at 1233.
53. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir 1991).
54. See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 202-05 (2d Cir. 1998); Childress at 508.
55. Childress, 945 F.2d at 505 (quoting H.R. REP No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1976)); see
Edward Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc., 221 F.2d 569, 570 (2nd Cir. 1955), rehear-
ing denied June 8, 1955. The court found requisite intent in that case, even though the composer of a
solo piano piece had no idea his piece would be subsequently merged with words by a lyricist he had
never met. However, because he transferred the rights to a publishing company, the court instead
looked to whether the publisher, as owner of the copyright, had the requisite intent concurrent to colla-
boration rather than the original author.
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The Seventh Circuit, having rejected the collaboration test, has been
somewhat less clear about the precise standard it has adopted. Within a
single opinion, the court alternatively explained the applicable intent stan-
dard as 1) intent that respective contributions be merged, 2) intent to create
a unitary work, and 3) mutual intent to create a joint work,56 referencing
three colossally different concepts as though they were interchangeable.
Most recently, the court has explained that "the focus is on the parties'
intent to work together in the creation of a single product, not on the legal
consequences of that collaboration." 57 In the same opinion, however, the
court declared that individuals are coauthors only where they "intend to
create joint work."58 These attempts at enunciating the intent standard are
difficult to reconcile, because collaborators may intend to create a "single
product" without intending that it ultimately be a "joint work." This is par-
ticularly vexatious because the term "joint work" has a specific legal mean-
ing,59 and the court disavows any standard that requires parties to have
actual knowledge of the legal consequences of authorship. 60 However dif-
ficult it may be to ascertain the controlling question in the Seventh Circuit,
the court has explicitly approved of the Second Circuit's Childress ap-
proach and has considered the same types of evidence probative. 61
The Ninth Circuit, effecting its own nuanced take on the Second Cir-
cuit intent test, has endeavored to create a functional multi-factor test, with
the qualifier that the factors "cannot be reduced to a rigid formula, because
the creative relationships to which they apply vary too much." 62 That said,
the court has synthesized its own prior decisions, as well as those in the
Second and Seventh Circuits and held that most of the considerations prob-
ative of intent fit into one of three categories: 1) the amount of control a
putative coauthor exerts over the creative process, 2) any objective manife-
stations of intent to share authorship, and 3) whether it is possible to deter-
mine the "audience appeal" that the putative author's contribution added to
the work as a whole.63
56. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068-69 (7th Cir. 1994).
57. Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir. 2009); see
Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1068-69.
58. Janky, 576 F.3d at 361.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
60. Janky, 576 F.3d at 362.
61. Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1068-69 (7th Cir. 1994).
62. Aalmuharmmed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999).
63. Id. at 1234.
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With these various tests and their fundamental principles in mind, we
now turn to the ways courts apply these tests to specific factual evidence,
and to how the law might be applied to our friends in Mjollnir's Wrath.
B. Subjective Evidence ofIntent
Because intent is by its nature a subjective mental state, courts often
begin their "mutual intent" analysis by attempting to ascertain the mindset
of the players. In contemplation of the group's psyche at the time of the
collaboration, courts have regularly relied on evidence pertaining to 1) who
exerted control of the creative process and 2) whether the collaborators had
any understanding of the coauthor relationship.
1. Controlling the Creative Process
Courts reaching the question of joint authorship have considered the
ability to exert control over the final creative product a key indicator of the
requisite intent in joint authorship for nearly a century. 64 The fact that a
particular individual has dominated the process has the effect of enlarging
the import of subjective intent analysis because where there is a dominant
author, "[i]t is only where the dominant author intends to be sharing au-
thorship that joint authorship will result."65
In the case of "traditional" musical collaborations, such as where one
individual writes music and another writes the words, this factor may war-
rant "less exacting consideration," presumably because courts are confident
in inferring intent to be coauthors in those contexts.66 By the same reason-
ing, then, a less traditional creative setting makes the search for a "master-
mind" who "superintends the work by exercising control" is even more
crucial.67 The Ninth Circuit has even gone so far as to say that the "control"
factor will often be the most important. 68 Yet despite its importance, that
court has acknowledged that it is often difficult to determine exactly who is
64. See Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. 211, 214-15 (2nd Cir. 1921) (citing the claimant's contractual
right of final approval on all changes to an opera as powerful evidence of the requisite authorship
intent); Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 202-03 (2nd Cir 1998) ("An important indicator of author-
ship is a contributor's decisionmaking authority over what changes are made and what is included in the
work[]").
65. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir 1991).
66. See Id
67. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234; See Childress, 945 F.2d at 508.
68. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234; Richlin v. MGM, 531 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2007).
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in "control" of a given creative process, but has suggested that it may be
the person most directly responsible for the financing. 69
What precisely constitutes control of the creative process has proven
to be a definitional challenge for the courts. While it may be said that any-
one who successfully manages to see his input realized in the final product
has exerted some "control," courts have held that there is an important
difference between offering suggestions that are accepted by another party
and issuing actual demands.70 Though it is clear that this critical partition
exists, courts have provided little guidance in locating it.
Within the context of songwriting, the Seventh Circuit in Janky v.
Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau recently held that a band
member "wielded considerable control over what the song finally looked
like" because he recommended revising the song's lyrics. 71 The court later
characterized the recommendations as "demands" rather than sugges-
tionS72-at least nominally differentiating the situation from those in which
other courts have held that suggestions are not acts of control. However, his
changes only "accounted for 10 percent of the lyrical input," and the musi-
cal structure was already in place by the time he was asked for feedback, so
it is unclear how or why he was in control. 73
Courts have held that one does not relinquish control and thereby lose
status as sole author merely by accepting the suggestions of another colla-
borator.74 But it is at also least arguable that the fact that an individual's
suggestion is included in the work at least supports an inference that the
person exerted some kind of control-perhaps particularly in a case where
little is known about the true power dynamic between collaborators.
Attempting to apply the "control" factor to the members of Mjillnir's
Wrath from the illustration in Part I, the irony of the courts' enhanced focus
69. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232 (internal citation omitted) (citing a film critic's argument
that "the person with creative control tends to be the person in whose name the money is raised"). In the
context of film alone, the court notes that such a person could be any one of a large number of individu-
als: the star, director, producer, cinematographer, even an animator or music composer.
70. See Id. at 1234 (making "helpful recommendations" that are accepted is not an act of author-
ship, unless the other party is bound to accept them); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061,
1072 (7th Cir. 1994) (authors should not be subject to "the threat that accepting suggestions from
another party might jeopardize the author's sole entitlement to a copyright); compare with Janky v.
Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2009) (collaborator's
"recommendations" were actually "demands").
71. Janky, 576 F.3d at 362.
72. Id. at 362.
73. Id. at 359-60.
74. See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234 (making "helpful recommendations" that are accepted is
not an act of authorship, unless the other party is bound to accept them); Erickson, 13 F.3d atl070
(authors should not be subject to "the threat that accepting suggestions from another party might jeo-
pardize the author's sole entitlement to a copyright).
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on this factor in less "traditional" collaborations comes into stark relief. It
is in precisely those environments where there is least likely to be any such
individual exerting the type of control the courts seem to expect they will
find.
Dominici, the guitarist, provided the earliest raw material for what ul-
timately became the song "Kicking Asgard," which could be viewed as
important creative decision-making. However, he exercised no decision-
making authority at all after that initial contribution, having abandoned the
project altogether. Yet if the Ninth Circuit is correct that securing the fi-
nancing is an indicator of control, the fact that Dominici's convenience
store clerking constituted the group's only source of sustenance or cash
could arguably play a role in considering his control of the creative
process. 75 By that same reasoning, however, Eddy from the record label
might also be seen as the dominant force, having provided the venue and
equipment.
It is even less clear as between Haglund and Cristo, who could be said
to have exercised the most control. Haglund, the drummer, was able to see
some of his suggestions realized (the harmony, the structural arrangements,
and the title), but it was Cristo, as engineer of the mechanical aspects of the
recording process, who implemented them. It is therefore debatable wheth-
er Cristo had final discretionary control over what finally ended up on the
tape or whether he complied because Haglund ordered him to do so. None
of the circuits enunciate a standard for locating the apparently critical line
separating "suggestions" from "demands." In any event, Cristo had no say
whatsoever in the lyrical content or basic harmonic structure of the song, so
it is difficult to make the case that he is the mastermind superintending the
song.
Skinz, finally, was really the only collaborator whose contributions
were not substantially checked by another band member, seeing almost
unfettered realization of his creative input. Additionally, the fact that he
contributed lyrics means that his collaboration was of a traditional variety
in music, so he will almost certainly be considered an author of some
kind.76 Still, his lack of effort and will in the songwriting process overall
makes it inconceivable that a fact finder would call him the dominant au-
thor. So this factor, which is said to provide considerable assistance in
helping courts assess intent in joint authorship, is ultimately not helpful at
75. See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232.
76. See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir 1991) (identifying a dominant contributor
warrants "less exacting" consideration in traditional collaborations, such as where one party contributes
lyrics and others contribute music).
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all here. The disparity in decision-making power between collaborators in
this all-too-common example is either negligible or incapable of being
measured.
2. Understanding the Coauthor Relationship
Because the heart of intent analysis is determining "how the putative
joint authors regarded themselves in relation to the work," 77 courts have
often sought guidance from evidence about the level of understanding col-
laborators had about the consequences of joint authorship.78 In order to
demonstrate authorship intent, putative coauthors must show they at least
"entertain[ed] in their minds the concept of joint authorship." 79 If collabo-
rators show some awareness of the "distinguishing characteristic" of the
coauthor relationship, then they can be said to have at least entertained the
concept.80 One such distinguishing characteristic is that all collaborators
are identified as authors to the outside world.81 Despite the fact that coau-
thors must have some concept of joint work, they need not understand the
legalities of authorship. 82 In fact, evidence that a collaborator entertained
the legal consequences of joint authorship may lend weight to a claim that
he intended to exclude others from authorship. 83
Turning back to the example of heavy metal aspirants Mjdllnir's
Wrath,84 there is no evidence that any of the band members knew the legal
consequences of coauthoring a song. However, it is arguably within the
ambit of common sense that being an author confers some legal benefits
that may be accompanied by financial benefits, and that sharing authorship
status means, at minimum, sharing those benefits with others. In a highly
disorganized creative process like the one employed by Mjallnir's Wrath,
application of this factor adds almost nothing to the intent calculus; it is
difficult to imagine a contributor so lacking in basic comprehension of the
consequences of authorship.
77. Id
78. Id; Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1066.
79. Childress, 945 F.2d at 508; Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1066.
80. Childress, 945 F.2d at 508.
81. See id (to determine whether putative coauthors understood the coauthor relationship, "a
useful test will be whether ... each participant intended that all would be identified as coauthors").
82. Id; Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1066.
83. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 205 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing the district court's finding that
Larson understood that the phrase 'coauthor' was "freighted with legal significance" in affirming the
holding that Larson never intended to share authorship status with Thomson).
84. Supra Part I.
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Given that each member probably had at least enough of an under-
standing of co-authorship to surpass the requirement, application becomes
unclear. Should one assume that each therefore intended to be a joint au-
thor? Or that, operating on self-interest, each intended to be a sole author?
In a setting like the one presented here, the fact that members may have had
an understanding about what authorship entails sheds very minimal light on
"how the putative joint authors regarded themselves in relation to the
work."85 Application of this factor to the creative environment of most
bands yields a result that is either trivially true or else meaningless. Almost
everyone in the "mix" will have some understanding of what it means to be
a coauthor, so that will not help a fact finder determine which members
actually believed themselves to be coauthors. Worse, courts may ultimately
wind up looking for who understood the most or who understood the loud-
est, which rewards those who manipulate uncertainty in the creative rela-
tionship.
C. Objective Evidence ofIntent
Courts are not entirely oblivious to the subjective evidentiary survey's
potential for rewarding manipulation and domination. Courts therefore
attempt to remedy this with an analysis of the objective indicators of shared
intent to jointly author a work.86 This is a necessary check, because, "were
the mutual intent to be determined by subjective intent, it could become an
instrument of fraud, were one coauthor to hide from the other an intention
to take sole credit for the work." 87 Therefore, in the absence of clear
agreement, "the inquiry must of necessity focus on the facts." 88 However,
as demonstrated below, even the objective manifestations of intent ex-
amined by the courts are still predominantly probative of one party's sub-
jective intent.
Courts have enumerated some basic categories of evidence they will
consider, but "the factors articulated ... cannot be reduced to a rigid for-
mula, because the creative relationships to which they apply vary too
much." 89 Regardless, courts have happened upon a certain "greatest hits"
of objective intent evidence. A discussion of the commonly considered
objective manifestations of intent follows.
85. Childress, 945 F.2d at 508.
86. See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999); Thomson, 147 F.3d at 201
n.17.
87. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234.
88. Id. at 1235.
89. Id.
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1. Billing
The way parties bill or credit themselves in relation to the work carries
great significance as an indicator of intent. 90 Though billing is characte-
rized as an "objective manifestation," 91 courts have recognized that billing
is often only a "window on the mind of the party who is responsible for
giving the billing or the credit."92 Nonetheless, courts regularly consider
billing evidence as very compelling; the Second Circuit has gone so far as
to say that a writer's attribution of a work as being one of the writer's sole
authorship is "prima facie proof that [the] work was not intended to be
joint."93 However, other courts have not appeared entirely in accord with
that broad language, explaining that billing alone is not decisive in all cas-
es, because joint authorship can exist in the absence of any explicit agree-
ment or discussion by the parties. 94
When four people like the musicians from Mjillnir's Wrath have a le-
gitimate dispute about who can claim authorship, there may be conflicting
billings, and it is unclear which billing the court will consider the authentic
billing. Here, Haglund held himself out to a studio as the sole author of the
work-constituting a billing. However, Cristo did scrawl the band name on
the cassette, arguably billing the work as one of joint authorship. It is hard
to see which is entitled to greater weight. Furthermore, in some circums-
tances, this factor really only demonstrates subjective intent, so again
courts are ultimately rewarding control as opposed to collaboration. Only
two members of the band in this scenario really had any opportunity to bill
themselves, but because they did so, their intentions become more impor-
tant in the analysis than those of the other two collaborators. The courts'
focus on this factor means that when one collaborator manifests a powerful
subjective will to be seen as an author by billing himself as such, that act
can assist in overwhelming the significant contributions of others that
might ordinarily serve to confer co-authorship.
2. Contracts with Third Parties
In the absence of any written agreements between the parties, courts
also consider any written agreements the putative authors enter into with
third parties to be helpful evidence of the way contributors regarded them-
90. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 203.
91. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234.
92. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 203 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
93. Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1320 (2d Cir. 1989).
94. Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir. 2009); see
Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1072 (7th Cir. 1994).
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selves in relation to the work.95 In particular, when one contributor enters
into a licensing agreement with a third party, this is strong evidence that he
does not intend to regard other contributors as authors.96 Similarly, entering
into a work-for-hire agreement indicates intent not to be a coauthor.97 The
Second Circuit expressed that the insight provided by looking at parties'
agreements with outsiders is "more attenuated" than that provided by the
billing, but did not explain why.98 That court's reasoning may be premised
on the idea that while the billing expressly states who is to be considered an
author, the intent of a party entering into a licensing agreement may fre-
quently have to be inferred.
Here, the only such agreement is the one between Haglund and the
television network that employs him, but this factor is yet another that fails
to help determine who can rightfully be called an author of "Kicking As-
gard." Because this factor is not dispositive, the fact that Haglund at-
tempted to license the song indicates that he thought he was an author, but
sheds no light on whether he believed he was a coauthor. Additionally,
Haglund's perception of himself as a coauthor empowered to enter into
licensing agreements regarding the work would still be of dubious weight
in the intent formulation given his minimal decision-making authority and
the court's pronouncement that this factor offers "attenuated" insight into
mutual intent.99
3. Other Conduct Consistent with Intent
Courts have emphasized that there may be "additional evidence" fall-
ing outside the categories above, indicating that a "broader pattern" of con-
duct may show the parties' intent.100 This acknowledgment of the
possibility that other types of evidence will be useful is necessitated by the
concern that application of a "rigid formula" would fail to respect the varie-
ty in creative relationships.o10
One such type of evidence is a collaborator's previous rejection of of-
fers to work with coauthors. For example, in Thomson v. Larson, the
95. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 204.
96. Id. (citing Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1072, for that court's holding that the fact that a playwright
entered into a licensing agreement with a third party indicated she did not consider the actors to be
coauthors).
97. See Richlin v. MGM, 531 F.3d 962, 969-70 (9th Cir. 2007); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d
1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999).
98. See Thomson, 147 F.3d at 204.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d,at 1234.
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Second Circuit found the fact that Larson had previously rejected the assis-
tance of a book writer in helping him complete the play, Rent, to be strong
evidence of a "broader pattern" indicating that he never intended to share
authorship.102Another type of evidence courts consider is conversations
between the parties to identify a pattern consistent with the intent to share
authorship. 0 3 Similarly, the fact that parties never had any conversation
about authorship may be considered as evidence that the person bringing
the action was not considered an author by other collaborators. 104 The
Second Circuit also treats the question of whether putative coauthors un-
derstood the legal ramifications or "distinguishing characteristic" of the
coauthor relationship as one of the "additional" types of evidence. 05 This
factor is discussed in detail above. 106 The willingness to cast a wide evi-
dentiary net allows courts the freedom to consider any and all conduct of
the parties and to assess whether it is consistent with the intent to be a
coauthor.
Turning back to the metal mayhem of Mj6llnir's Wrath, it seems clear
that Dominici's conduct in composing and recording guitar riffs manifests
intent to be an author. The question, of course, is whether his conduct
represents intent to be a coauthor. A court could find the fact that he aban-
doned the work to be evidence that he intended to end any creative rela-
tionship with the other members. Conversely, one could argue that he
certainly intended to be a coauthor when he performed the work; the reason
he left was precisely because the others were not contributing. Alternative-
ly, a court could find that the fact that he abandoned the tape altogether
knowing that the label representative was expecting some kind of demo
product suggests he intended for his contributions to be used by the remain-
ing members as part of a joint work.
Similar ambiguity exists in looking at Haglund and Cristo's behaviors.
Courts would very likely attempt to parse their parting conversation about
the tape, in which Cristo requested that Haglund let people know he
worked on the song. That is certainly not the same thing as saying, "make
sure to credit me as a coauthor," but it is arguably consistent with viewing
102. 147 F.3d at 204.
103. See id at 205 (conversation in which Larson told Thomson he would "always acknowledge
[her] contribution," and "would never say that [he] wrote what [she] did" was "entirely consistent" with
Larson's purported view of himself as the sole author.)
104. See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1235 (citing the absence in the record of any conversations
about Aalmuhammed's authorship in the work as evidence that no one regarded him as an author).
105. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 205 (the fact that Larson understood the term, coauthor, to be "freighted
with legal significance" supported the view that he did not intend to be a coauthor).
106. Supra Part Ill.B..
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himself as an author. However, the fact that he relinquished the tape to
Haglund is more ambiguous. Is it conduct consistent with Cristo's view of
Haglund as a coauthor or evidence that he did not view himself as an au-
thor at all?
Finally turning to Skinz, his conduct seems most consistent with the
view that he did not think about his relationship to the work at all; he was
just far too "out of it." However, because he contributed lyrics-a "tradi-
tional" form of musical collaboration-the courts would be unlikely to
worry much about the fact that his conduct does not indicate any discerna-
ble intent toward the work.107
4. Audience Appeal
Audience appeal is a consideration unique to the Ninth Circuit, and it
arguably has nothing to do with intent. It instead asks whether the audience
appeal of the work turns on each of the contributions and whether it is
possible to appraise the share of each contribution to the overall success of
the work. The courts have not elaborated on how to apply this element,
except to essentially acknowledge that it is "nearly impossible" in the con-
text of film.108 In Richlin v. MGM, the court noted the impracticability of
determining how much the characters and story (originated by Richlin), as
opposed to Peter Seller's performance, Henry Mancini's score, or Blake
Edwards's direction, provided the "main draw" of The Pink Panther.109
Though the court has offered little guidance in applying the factor, its ap-
proach in Richlin indicates that the impossibility of determining the "main
draw" of a work weighs in favor of the person claiming to be a joint au-
thor.1 10
It is unsurprising, then, that this factor is as treacherous when applied
to heavy metal music as it is in the context of a Pink Panther film. Perhaps
it is possible to imagine what the song would sound like without certain
musical contributions, but it is far more problematic to imagine the work's
popularity without any one of these individual contributions. Surely Domi-
nici's prototypic riffs, Skinz's manic lyrics, Cristo's arrangement instincts,
and Haglund's drumming and other feedback all play some role in how
audiences relate to and enjoy the work. To the extent that the audience-
appeal factor is truly relevant to intent at all, perhaps the fact that no partic-
107. See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir 1991); supra note 71 and accompanying
text.
108. Richlin v. MGM, 531 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2007).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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ular contribution accounts for the lion's share of the song's reception in the
culture supports a finding that the song is a joint work, at least on the basis
of intent.
D. The Timing of Intent
The courts are curiously split on the question of whether the requisite
intent to create a joint work and the actual creation of the work must exist
contemporaneously or whether intent may exist at some later time after
some or all of the work is complete. The Second Circuit has held that if
intent that one's contributions be "absorbed or combined into an integrated
unit" is to suffice in establishing joint authorship, then that intent must exist
contemporaneously with the creation of the putative coauthor's contribu-
tion.111 The Seventh Circuit concurs that putative coauthors must "intend to
be joint authors at the time the work [i]s created."ll 2 Under this approach,
if intent to regard oneself as a coauthor forms after the contribution is
crafted, that will not serve the intent requirement of Section 101. Similarly,
if such intent evaporates after the fact, that would not negate the once-
existing intent to be a coauthor. This may be very difficult to apply in many
modem musical settings, where artists do not always do the "work" at the
same time, but write and record independently, piece-by-piece. It is not
entirely clear what purpose is served by limiting analysis to the intent of the
parties at the time the work is being done.
In contrast to that approach, the Ninth Circuit has acknowledged the
reality that "relationship[s] may change over time as the work proceeds"ll 3
and imposes no requirement as to the contemporaneousness of intent. This
in effect could mean that the court will consider the parties' intent with
regard to the work before, during, and after the creative process is com-
plete. No cases have addressed this issue yet, but it is foreseeable that the
Ninth Circuit, by taking into account the evolution of the parties' intent
over time, may reach a result more in line with the expectations of artists,
who know all too well that the way a collaborator views himself and others
in relation to the work is not a static concept.
Under the view of the Second and Seventh Circuits, the fact that Do-
minici abandoned the tapes might have no effect. The only consideration
would be his intent at the time he was recording the riffs, and at that point it
seems likely he intended for the others to contribute and merge their work
111. Childress, 945 F.2d at 505 (quoting H.R. REP NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1976)).
112. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1070 (7th Cir. 1994).
113. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999).
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with his into a unitary whole. Likewise, Haglund's intent at the time he
took the tape containing "Kicking Asgard" or at the time he licensed it to
the television network would not be determinative; the only intent that
matters is his intent at the time he made the contributions. Cristo's intent
toward the work probably did not change much over time, so this factor
may not affect analysis with regard to him. Skinz is another matter, because
at the time he did the work, he was so drunk arguably that he lacked any
capacity to form intent. If he had any intent to be an author of the work, it
was formed prior to his contributions or subsequent to them. In this regard,
the Ninth Circuit approach would certainly be a boon to Skinz. It may also
benefit Dominici by at least allowing for the possibility that though he in-
tended to be a coauthor at the time he did the work, his intent changed once
he quit the project.
This analysis of the contemporaneousness element concludes the dis-
cussion of "intent" in joint work. The next section explores the amount and
nature of the contribution that putative authors must make in order for their
intent to be coauthors of a joint work to have any legal effect.
IV. BRING THE NOISE:114 MAKING A CONTRIBUTION WORTHY OF AN
AUTHOR
Consistent with the Constitution's goal of promoting "the progress of
science and useful arts,"' 15 the exclusive rights enjoyed by holders of copy-
right cannot be enjoyed by anyone but the work's true creator or creators.
Though the Copyright Act does not specify any requisite quantum of con-
tribution an author must make, courts and commentators have agreed that
some threshold must be set, but have disagreed as to where. This first fol-
lowing subsection examines the ongoing controversy surrounding the na-
ture of a contribution one must make in order to surpass this initial barrier
to entry into the class of authors, and the second assesses the copyrightabil-
ity of some common contributions made by collaborators in the songwrit-
ing process.
114. ANTHRAX & PUBLIC ENEMY, Bring The Noise, on ATTACK OF THE KILLER B's (Island 1991)
and APOCALYPSE 91 ... THE ENEMY STRIKES BACK (Def Jam 1991). One of the earliest successful
attempts at merging metal with hip hop. GARY SHARPE-YOUNG, METAL: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 97
(Joel Mclver ed., 2007).
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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A. Independently Copyrightable vs. Non-de minimis Contributions
Currently, all three federal circuits discussed in this note hold that in
order to claim authorship in a joint work, a collaborator must make a con-
tribution that would be copyrightable independently of the work as a
whole. This requirement, attributed to Professor Paul Goldstein, has been a
flashpoint of academic debate.11 6 Though the opposition, mounted by Pro-
fessors Melville Nimmer and David Nimmer, failed for years to gather
steam, the Seventh Circuit has recently recognized the need to craft an
exception to the Goldstein rule.117 However, the precise contours of that
exception are hazy in light of subsequent decisions. The first task below
will be to compare the reasoning each circuit has applied in adopting the
requirement, and then to a discuss the Seventh Circuit exception and its
import in the evolution of joint copyright law as well as how the exception
may have been altered by recent case law.
1. The Rationale of the "Independently Copyrightable" Rule
In determining whether only an independently copyrightable contribu-
tion should entitle one to claim authorship, courts have admitted the "troub-
ling" nature of the problem-after all, copyrightable works are, by their
very nature, the result of combining a non-copyrightable idea with a tangi-
ble expression.1 8 Even courts adopting the rule have conceded that "the
resulting work is no less a valuable result .. . simply because the idea and
the expression came from two different individuals." 1 9
Courts, in seeking to explain the reasoning for adopting this rigid
standard, have disagreed on its relation to the text of Section 101 of the
Copyright Act.120 The Second Circuit, for example, has explicitly held that
the statutory standard is not adequately "stringent" enough to prevent free-
loading by "overreaching contributors."'21 By explaining the standard as
one not mandated by the text of the Copyright Act, but necessary to effec-
tuate its purpose, the court reasoned that adopting the bright line standard
served the necessary interests of reducing spurious claims and striking an
116. The "warring camps" are thought be represented by Professors Melville and David Nimmer on
one hand (supporting only a non-de minimis requirement), and Professor Paul Goldstein on the other
(supporting a copyrightable contribution requirement). See Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1069-71; infra Part
IV.A.l.
117. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2004).
118. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506 (2d Cir. 1991).
119. Id.
120. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
121. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998).
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"appropriate balance in the domains of both copyright and contract law" by
forcing collaborators who make lesser contributions to the work to nego-
tiate for their rights in the work.122
The Seventh Circuit has essentially endorsed the Second Circuit's rea-
soning, finding little in the way of support for its interpretation of the sta-
tute within the letter of Section 101, but nonetheless rejecting Professor
Nimmer's non-de minimis standard in favor of Goldstein's independent
copyrightability standard.123 The Seventh Circuit's somewhat varied route
to the same destination hinged on its fear that the de minimis standard alone
would be unpredictable in application, ultimately restricting the free ex-
change of ideas and defeating the purpose of copyright writ large.124 How-
ever, the Seventh Circuit has had second thoughts with regard to adopting
the Goldstein rule and has recently crafted an exception to the requirement
of independent copyrightability.
The Ninth Circuit, to the contrary, supported its decision to impose the
independently copyrightable contribution standard on putative coauthors on
the text of Section 101. The court explained that since Section 101 defines
a joint work as one prepared by more than one "author," 25-and that as a
threshold issue, one cannot be an author without creating a copyrightable
work-the statute therefore requires all coauthors to contribute something
copyrightable separate from the work as a whole.126 The court has noted
that these are entirely different grounds from those upon which courts in
the Second and Seventh Circuits have imposed the same requirement.1 27
2. Gaiman: Toward a More Flexible Contribution Requirement
If the Seventh Circuit approach early on seemed to be essentially co-
opting the Second Circuit approach, all of that changed in 2004. In Gaiman
v. McFarlane, the court saw the necessity of an exception to this rigid rule
in cases where, "due to the nature of the creative process," none of the in-
dividual contributions alone could pass the copyrightability test. 128 In par-
122. Childress, 945 F.2d at 507. This approach has been roundly criticized by the Professors Nim-
mer in their treatise, and the Seventh Circuit has recently identified the danger of applying this require-
ment in all creative contexts. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
6.07; Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2004).
123. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994).
124. Id at 1070.
125. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)..
126. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 1999).
127. Id.
128. 360 F.3d 644, 658-659 (7th Cir. 2004). The court in that case held that the independent copy-
rightability test should not apply to establishing coauthorship in comic book characters because comic
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ticular, the court identified contributors to "mixed media" creative ventures
(specifically, comic books) as qualifying for the exception because in many
cases individuals who fully intend to be coauthors in those settings make
contributions that, by the nature of the process itself, cannot be copy-
righted.129 Echoing Nimmer's logic, the court explained that in these crea-
tive environs, each putative coauthor's individual contribution fails the
copyright test, but remains essential to lending the distinctiveness to the
finished work that carries it "over the line into copyright land." 30
Within the creative arenas where the Seventh Circuit's exception to
the independent copyrightability requirement is permitted, a putative coau-
thor must still demonstrate that his contributions to the work surpass the
level of de minimis additions. 131 In order to do so, anyone claiming to be a
coauthor must have at least contributed some "original expression."1 32 So
originality still controls, even in absence of the hard line requirement of
copyrightability-a person cannot claim to be an author on the basis of
contributions that are "so rudimentary, commonplace, standard, or un-
avoidable that they do not serve to distinguish one work within a class of
works from another."133 Like the Second Circuit, which held that a contri-
bution amounting to less than nine percent of the total work was found to
surpass the de minimis bar,134 the Seventh Circuit recently held that a
songwriter who contributed about ten percent of a song's lyrics had indeed
demonstrated he was a coauthor.135
The court, in crafting this exception, did so because in the process of
creating certain types of works, "one can imagine cases in which none of
the separate contributions" will be independently copyrightable.136 Howev-
er, in the recent case, Janky v. Lake County Convention and Visitors Bu-
reau, the court implicitly acknowledged that the Gaiman exception might
apply to musical compositions, but only when none of the contributions are
books are usually the product of the work of an author, penciler, inker, and colorist and "one can im-
agine" cases in which none of their individual contributions could be copyrightable.
129. Id. at 658-659.
130. Id. at 659.
131. Id. (acknowledging the "valid core" of Professor Nimmer's "heretical" argument in favor of
applying only a de minimis standard to contributions in evaluating co-authorship).
132. Id. at 658.
133. See Id. (quoting Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003).
134. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 201, n.14. (2d Cir. 1998).
135. Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 362-63 (7th Cir. 2009)
(remanding for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Visitors Bureau on finding that licensor of a
song to the Bureau who contributed approximately ten percent of the song's lyrical content was a
coauthor and therefore entitled to license the work).
136. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
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in fact independently copyrightable.137 If this is true, then Janky represents
a significant alteration to Gaiman by further limiting its application to situ-
ations where no one makes a copyrightable contribution. Until the court
reconciles these holdings or otherwise clarifies the exception, it appears
that if one contributor has made a copyrightable contribution, the class of
authors is limited to others who have done the same. 138
Imagining that the Seventh Circuit had to determine the authorship
status of MjIllnir's Wrath members in regard to the opus, "Kicking As-
gard," it seems the glimmer of hope Gaiman offered members who made
non-copyrightable but major contributions is less luminous post-Janky. As
discussed in the next section, 139 Dominici and Skinz are on relatively solid
ground in terms of making copyrightable contributions, but the status of
Haglund and Cristo's contributions is not so assured. If Janky is correct,
then the Gaiman exception cannot apply to them, because once one person
makes an independently copyrightable contribution, the exception disap-
pears. In that event, their status as authors may not turn on the intent ele-
ment;140instead, their claims may live or die on the basis of whether they
made copyrightable contributions. The copyrightability of various types of
contributions is addressed immediately below.
3. Copyrightable Musical Contributions
Outside the narrow and uncertain parameters of the Gaiman exception
in the Seventh Circuit, anyone asserting a right as a coauthor of a joint
work must show that the contributions forming the basis of that claim are,
themselves, independently copyrightable. The application of this require-
ment to different types of musical contributions varies across jurisdictions
and has evolved over time.
137. Janky, 576 F.3d at 362 n.4. In this recent case, the court reasoned that the Gaiman exception
did not apply to the facts of a songwriting dispute because Janky's contribution was copyrightable
before putative coauthor Farag made any contribution. This is arguably a misapplication of the Gaiman
rule-the Janky court holds that the exception only obtains when none of the contributions are in fact
independently copyrightable, but the Gaiman decision seems to extend the exception to any creative
context in which "one can imagine cases in which none of the separate contributions" will be copyrigh-
table (emphasis added). Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 659. The Gaiman standard is quite a bit more generous,
and would be more likely to encompass songwriting in the abstract.
138. Compare Janky, 576 F.3d at 362 n.4 (putative author's claim, when based on a contribution
merged with another individual's independently copyrightable work, must itself be based on indepen-
dently copyrightable work) with Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 659 (where the nature of the creative process
makes it foreseeable that while the finished work will be copyrightable, the individual contributions
may not be, a claim of authorship need not be based on an independently copyrightable contribution).
139. SeeinfraPartIV.B.1-5.
140. See supra Part Ill.
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a. Sound Engineering and Arrangement
Courts have shown some comfort with the idea that a collaborator who
is responsible for "capturing and electronically processing . .. sounds, and
compiling and editing them to make a final sound recording" has made an
independently copyrightable contribution allowing the possibility of au-
thorship, because this type of contribution shows a considerable level of
"independent thought and creativity."l41 The courts' willingness to find
that an engineer's contributions are copyrightable is facilitated by the fact
that the engineer's work is fixed in a tangible medium and because courts
have found legislative history supporting the view that Congress considered
the work of sound engineers to be copyrightable.142
However, in the case of one who arranges or rearranges a song, this
may not always be the case. As a mechanical matter, the person who is
proposing changes to the work may not be the same person responsible for
bringing those changes to life. The courts are generally in agreement that
where one individual makes suggestions about altering a creative work, but
the final discretion rests entirely in the hands of a principal, those sugges-
tions are not copyrightable contributions, and courts have adhered to the
rule that "directions" and "ideas" cannot suffice as contributions warranting
authorship.143
The Seventh Circuit has recently distinguished that rule by holding
that under some circumstances a putative coauthor's recommendations of
certain changes to a song suffice as "concrete expressions" and will not be
denied copyright protection for lack of tangible fixation.144 Under this ex-
141. See JCW Inv., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (quoting
Systems XIX, Inc. v. Parker, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1228 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (internal citation omitted));
see also Ulloa v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
142. See Systems XIX, Inc. v. Parker, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1228 (N.D. Cal 1998) (relying on H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1976) as evidence that Congress specifically contemplated
the sound engineer/recording artist relationship as one in which the sound engineer would "usually" be
an author in the sound recording, if not the composition).
143. Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Gaiman v. McFarlane,
360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1072 (7th Cir.
1994); S.O.S. Inc. v. Payday Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) for the proposition that an "author" is one who trans-
lates an idea into a fixed expression).
144. See Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 362-63 (7th Cir. 2009).
In Janky, songwriter Cheryl Janky, on a suggestion by band mate Henry Farag, wrote a song intended
for use by the Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau, located in Indiana's South Shore region.
The original version had lyrics focused on Indiana, but not specifically on Lake County and the South
Shore. Farag recommended that Janky make changes to about ten percent of the song's lyrics to en-
hance its appeal to the Visitors Bureau. Ultimately, Farag succeeded in licensing the song to the Bureau,
who used it in advertisements and events. Janky sued for infringement, but the court held that Farag was
a coauthor, and in the process held that his recommendations for revisions to the song were an indepen-
dently copyrightable contribution.
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panded concept of fixation, recommendations must still rise above the level
of "ideas, refinements, and suggestions;"rather, such input must constitute
something akin to "demands" on another person who ultimately commits
the song to recorded media to meet this standard.145
This subcategory of creation cuts right to the heart of Haglund and
Cristo's most significant contributions to the song "Kicking Asgard." Cris-
to, as sound engineer, might have an easier time convincing a court that his
contributions were copyrightable-the benefit of being the engineer is that
the very nature of the process results in expressions of ideas being fixed in
a tangible medium. Haglund's proposed changes, on the other hand, will
not be seen as copyrightable, unless he brings suit in the Seventh Circuit,
where demands are (for the moment) independently copyrightable expres-
sions.
b. Song Titles and Lyrics
Song titles are the classic example of a contribution that is not copy-
rightable, no matter how original. The modem consensus on this issue is
expressed by current Copyright Office Regulations specifying that
"[w]ords and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans" may not be
the subject of copyright-a position the Second Circuit and courts else-
where have been in agreement with since long before the 1976 Act.146 It is
worth noting, however, that the Copyright Act does not explicitly preclude
song titles from being copyrightable, and some courts have shown some
willingness to extend copyright protection to titles of songs, books, or films
if they were "arbitrary or fictitious or fanciful or artificial or technical." 47
Indeed, one court even stated in dicta that if a song title is extraordinarily
unique, such as "Supercalifragilisticexpialidocious," an exception might
apply.148 For the moment, this issue appears to be settled. Similarly, there
is currently no controversy over the fact that, unlike titles, lyrics are inde-
pendently copyrightable as literary works.149
145. Id. at 363 (quoting Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 658).
146. 37 CFR § 202.1(a) (2009); see also Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Majestic Pictures Corp., 70
F.2d 310, 311 (2d Cir. 1934) (holding that the copyright protections attending ownership of a play did
not extend to the title itself, but nonetheless granting an injunction restricting defendants from using the
motion picture title "The Gold Diggers" on trademark grounds); Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 187 P.2d 474, 483 (Cal. App. 2d 1947).
147. Johnston, 187 P.2d at 482.
148. Life Music, Inc. v. Wonderland Music Co., 241 F. Supp. 653, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (stating, in
dicta, that even had defendants only appropriated the use of the title of the popular song from the film
"Mary Poppins," that could "conceivably" have constituted infringement).
149. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ'g, 512 F.3d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 2007); ABKCO Music
Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1996).
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It seems evident that Haglund's naming of the song will not be rele-
vant to determining whether his contributions warrant authorship, because
a song title simply cannot be copyrighted. There is similarly little doubt
about the copyrightability of Skinz's lyrics, regardless of the reality that
they were the result of stream-of-consciousness rambling.
c. Rhythmic Modifications, Improvisation, and Chord Progressions
A handful of cases preceding the 1976 Copyright Act advance a doc-
trine that contributions consisting only of "embellishments such as are im-
provised by any competent musician," or basic rhythm patterns over an
existing piece, are not sufficiently original to be eligible for copyright pro-
tection.o50 Courts following this reasoning have held that "anything which
a fairly good musician can make, the same old tune being preserved,
[can]not be the subject of a copyright."'51
More recent cases have allowed that slight modification to basic
rhythms may elevate a contribution to the level or originality demanded by
copyright, so long as the part is not so "universal" as to be considered
"stock." 52 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
has, for example, held that a song "hook" consisting of a short phrase pre-
ceded by an 'eighth note-quarter note-eighth note' rhythmic beat could be
copyrightable.153 The same court has also held that repetition of the word
'uh-oh' in a distinctive rhythm was sufficiently original to qualify for copy-
right protection.154 This comports with the understanding that the bar for
originality "is [set] extremely low."s5 5 A recent unreported Ninth Circuit
case specifically addressed percussion, holding that a drummer's playing
was independently copyrightable.156
With regard to guitar riffs, courts have found the requisite creativity to
suffice as copyrightable, even where a nearly identical combination of pitch
150. McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp, 166 F. Supp. 681, 683 (S.D. Cal. 1958); see also Norden
v. Oliver Ditson Co., 13 F. Supp. 415, 418 (D. Mass. 1936) (holding that a work that amounts to "a
copy of the old, with minor changes which any skilled musician might make" is not a copyrightable
work).
151. Cooper v. James, 213 F. 871, 872 (N.D. Ga. 1914).
152. BMS Entm't/Heat Music LLC v. Bridges, 2005 WL 1593013 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2005).
153. See id. at *5. Among the purported infringers in that case were hip-hop giants Ludacris and
Kanye West.
154. Santrayall v. Burrell, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1052, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1996).
155. Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
156. See Lopez v. Musinorte Entm't Corp., 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 4035 at *3 (9th Cir. 2007). The
court held that a drummer's contributions were independently copyrightable contributions to the record-
ing, but not the compositions themselves, since no one in the band actually wrote the songs. While the
case is instructive here, because it was not published, 9th Circuit rules prevent it from being cited as
precedent in the circuit.
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progression and rhythm has been used in previous songs, provided the gui-
tarist made at least some minor alteration and no reasonable person could
confuse it with another work.I 57Dominici's guitar riffs would almost cer-
tainly surpass the requirements of copyrightability, even if they were com-
pletely lacking in innovation, provided they were not identical to a
copyrighted work already in existence.
Haglund and Cristo may be able to show that their respective bass line
and drum parts were copyrightable, especially under what appears to be a
less exacting standard emerging in the more recent cases. The cited cases
holding that basic improvisation and rhythm are not copyrightable when
added to an existing structure were all decided before the 1976 Copyright
Act.158 However, one could argue that they are still good law because they
express a common sense concept that when one musician provides the
"seed" for a song, a contribution must truly change the character of the
work in order for it to be independently copyrightable. It is at least arguable
that a bass part merely doubling the guitar and a drum pattern that does
nothing other than keep time does not transform the song in the least, and
that therefore both Cristo and Haglund failed to surpass the copyrightable
subject matter bar with respect to these contributions.
d. Harmonies
Harmony parts also have dubious standing as to originality, as one
court notes, because:
where the composition of the melody is completed by one person and the
harmony is thereafter fumished by another, the harmony may be less
likely to reflect originality than in those instances in which simultaneous
composition of melody and harmony is utilized to create certain musical
effects. 159
Indeed, some courts have been unwilling to hold that copyright protection
extends to harmonies at all, observing the composition of harmony as a
semi-mechanical process "achieved according to rules which have been
known for many years."l 60 However, other courts have noted that certain
157. See ZZ Top v. Chrysler Corp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 983, 986 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (finding that the
guitar riff to Z.Z. Top's La Grange was sufficiently different from pre-existing works to be copyrighta-
ble, because even though it used the same rhythm and pitches as previous songs, "no reasonable person
could confuse the two," even if they only heard a few seconds of each).
158. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp, 166 F. Supp. 681, 683 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Norden
v. Oliver Ditson Co., 13 F. Supp. 415, 418 (D. Mass. 1936); Cooper v. James, 213 F. 871, 872 (N.D.
Ga. 1914).
159. Tempo Music v. Famous Music Corp., 838 F. Supp. 162, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (addressing
copyrightability in the context of a derivative work, the court stated that as a matter of law, harmony
alone can be copyrightable-but it is less likely to be when the melody entirely pre-exists it).
160. Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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harmonies might yet be copyrightable, because the putative author must
still make creative decisions about what harmonic interval to use. Those
courts, nonetheless, maintain that "[h]armony is a derivative creation al-
most by definition." 61
The harmonies' 62 used in "Kicking Asgard" owe their existence in
part to both Haglund (who proposed a basic, formulaic harmony) and Cris-
to (who took that idea and instead applied counterpoint theory to devise a
contrasting melody instead). Haglund's original proposal resembles the
mechanically derived part that courts have indicated might be less likely to
be copyrightable. Furthermore, even if Haglund's harmony was sufficiently
original, it might not have met the tangible fixation requirement,163 because
it was Cristo who ultimately brought the idea to life. Cristo, then, benefits
from this analysis in two ways: one, because his use of counterpoint theory
to craft a contrasting part is more likely to be considered original, and two,
because he physically committed the idea to tape, surpassing the tangible
fixation bar.
Now that the copyrightability of various types of contributions has
been evaluated, the analysis of the quantum of a contribution required by
the federal courts to qualify as an author of a joint work is complete. The
final section summarizes the deficits presented by this section and the pre-
ceding section on mutual intent. 164
V. CAN I PLAY WITH THE MADNESS: 165 UNCERTAINTY PERVADES
MODERN CO-AUTHORSHIP DISPUTES
The preceding sections of this note surveyed the ways that the courts
of the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits approach the question of joint
authorship in the absence of written agreements and applied the current
approaches to a hypothetical heavy metal band, Mj6llnir's Wrath. The
analysis reveals that the courts' approach to the question of intent is not
well calibrated to deal with situations like this one, because it is too heavily
focused on the idea of control to be meaningful in a context where control
is hard to define. The analysis also shows that the courts' approach in re-
161. Tempo Music, 838 F. Supp. at 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
162. Contrasting melodies based on counterpoint are not technically "harmonies." See supra note
14.
163. The Seventh Circuit might find that by demanding the change, he did meet this element. See
supra note 142 and accompanying text.
164. See supra Part Ill.
165. IRON MAIDEN, Can I Play With Madness, on SEVENTH SON OF A SEVENTH SON (Capitol
1988). The album was Iron Maiden's first to debut at #1 on UK charts. GARY SHARPE-YOUNG, METAL:
THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 77 (Joel McIver ed., 2007).
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quiring that coauthors make independently copyrightable contributions to
the work could fail to reward some contributions that are critical to the
work's success. The narrow exception to that rule, carved out by the Se-
venth Circuit, has uncertain applications that are made even more uncertain
in light of subsequent cases. The following sections critique in greater de-
tail the current statutory interpretation scheme.
A. Powerslave:166 Mutual Intent Regime Rewards Domination, not Crea-
tion
It is mystifying that the requirement of mutual intent has not been sub-
ject of nearly as much controversy as the independent copyrightability re-
quirement. An initial disquieting aspect of the mutual intent approach
adopted by these federal courts, albeit in nuanced forms, is the way courts
answer the question, "Intent to do what?" Section 101 seems to require
only that contributions be merged intentionally,167 but this so-called "colla-
boration alone" standard has struck the courts as unsatisfactory because, in
their view, it would award authorship status to hordes of the undeserv-
ing. 168 However, abandoning that standard in favor of a plethora of multi-
factor balancing tests that, as argued below, favors authoritarians as op-
posed to authors, the courts may have managed to thwart their own policy
objective.
At the outset, it is worth noting that "mutual intent" is a figment-
there simply is no such thing. Intent, being a subjective state of mind, can-
not be shared; this requirement will always necessitate an inquiry into what
each individual intended and the extent to which that coincides with what
others intended. That would not be so troubling; what is most disturbing
about the way mutual intent is dealt with by these federal courts is that each
of them have become so fixated on "control" that in many cases the ques-
tion of joint authorship turns on whether the person who was best able to
dominate the creative process was in the mood to share. Thomson is the
shining example of how willing the courts have been to allow an opportu-
nistic "dominant" collaborator to secure sole authorship in a work merely
by manifesting a powerful subjective intent to exclude.169 The court impli-
citly accepted that Thomson's contributions were independently copyright-
able and well beyond de minimis, but Larson's stated desire to be the sole
166. IRON MAIDEN, Powerslave, on POWERSLAVE (EMI 1984).
167. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
168. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1069 (7th Cir. 1994).
169. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 1998).
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author ultimately trumped his conflicting behavior of allowing someone to
rewrite significant portions of his work.
Courts, evidently aware that the mutual intent standard looks a great
deal like a subjective adventure into the mind of the chief collaborator,
have compensated by enumerating various "objective" indicia of intent in
order to further guide analysis.170 The problem, of course, is not only that
these rarely occur, but when they do, they are highly likely to have been
manipulated by an opportunistic collaborator-the same "dominant" person
whose subjective intent often becomes synonymous with "mutual intent."
The entire intent analysis, then, is biased against a good faith collaborator
who comes up short of swagger.
In the context of a band, it is not uncommon for one individual to hold
dominion over the others in the creative process. This often has more to do
with personality types than with the sheer creative genius of the individual
who manages to reign or with the weight of that person's contributions to
the work. Nonetheless, such a person is likely to prevail in legal disputes,
not only because he can claim to have controlled the process, but also be-
cause in the process of so doing, he can ensure that any and all objective
evidence of intent corroborates his subjective intent to exclude others. Un-
fortunately, absent an amendment to the Copyright Act to either clarify or
eradicate "intent," courts will likely continue to resort to an intent inquiry
that allows ambitious collaborators to outmaneuver other would-be authors.
B. You've Got Another Thing Comin': 7 Independent Copyrightability
Requirement Defies Artist's Expectations and Common Sense
Though each circuit explored here has found a different path to impos-
ing the independently copyrightable requirement, they have each done so.
The Seventh Circuit seems to be experiencing buyer's remorse. However,
as discussed above, the recent decision in Jankyl 72 may not leave much of
the temporary sanity of Gaiman1 73 intact.
170. See id. at 202-205; Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 1991).
171. JUDAS PRIEST, You've Got Another Thing Comin', on SCREAMING FOR VENGEANCE (Colum-
bia 1982). The record was certified Double Platinum in 2001, and was the first album by any artist to be
released in its entirety as downloadable content for the video game Rock Band. Susan Arendt, First
Downloadable Rock Bank Album: Judas Priest (April 18, 2008),
http://www.wired.com/gamelife/2008/04/first-downloada/. Gary Graff, The Power of the Priest, Bill-
board, July 4, 2009 at 28; Ayala Ben-Yehuda, Antony Bruno, Susan Butler, Johnathan Cohen, Mark
Russel, Ken Tucker & Ray Waddell. The latest news from .biz, BILLBOARD, April 26, 2008 at 5.
172. Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 362 n.4 (7th Cir. 2009).
173. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2004).
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One fault of the requirement is that it is arbitrary in light of the reality
that all copyrighted works consist of copyrightable and non-copyrightable
components. But that is not the greatest threat posed by this standard. Ra-
ther, the real problem is that the requirement has the truly unfortunate side
effect of either discouraging specialists who work in expressing ideas from
ever collaborating or harming them when they do. This grows out of the
ignorance about the joint creative process inherent to the requirement-the
act of "fixation" is just one stage of collaboration. The requirement of in-
dependent copyrightability for any contribution to warrant joint authorship
in the work heaps all the rewards on the individual or individuals to whom
the work of fixation has been delegated and therefore destroys the rights of
those whose expressions of ideas made the fixed contribution a possibility.
Courts have rejected a simple non-de minimis standard in favor of this
one, primarily in response to a perceived need to short-circuit frivolous
claims. 174 However, there is no basis for assuming that doing away with the
bright line copyrightable contribution rule would result in chaos. Moreover,
given the reality, acknowledged by the Second Circuit in Childress, that
some persons who are highly skilled in the "fixation" step might never
create anything but for the contribution of ideas from another person,175 it
is submitted that no need for predictability should trump the plain injustice
of permanently excluding those who work in the medium of ideas from
authorship in joint works.
Many successful bands have a member whose primary contributions
are ideas-for structural rearrangement, for additional parts, for editing,
and so on. Without this person's "ear" for polishing the work, songs might
never reach their potential; as such, this person is an indispensable part of
the songwriting process, but rarely contributes a copyrightable element. It
would shock many independent musicians to learn that such contributions
would not suffice to demonstrate authorship. More importantly, this techni-
cality stands in the way of the Constitution's goal of promoting progress
and advancement in arts and sciences176 by serving notice to "idea special-
ists" that their valuable contribution will become the exclusive property of
the collaborator who succeeds in achieving its fixation. It is difficult to
imagine the inertia shifting overnight, but perhaps Judge Posner's though-
tful opinion in Gaiman1 77 will provide fuel and courage to other courts that
properly intuit the hazardous byproducts of this antiquated standard.
174. See Childress, 945 F.2d at 507.
175. Id. at 506.
176. U.S. Const. art. I § 8.
177. 360 F.3d 644.
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C. Endgame:78 Parting Shots and Final Thoughts
The future of heavy metal is probably not in immediate jeopardy as a
result of the inefficiencies and inadequacies presented here-uncertainty
and unfairness are, after all, near ubiquitous elements of a struggling art-
ist's bittersweet diet. But while it is unlikely that Benjamin Franklin would
have been a fan of Guns N' Roses, the fact that the framers of the Constitu-
tion sought to build protections for creators directly into the founding doc-
ument of the United States ought to serve to elevate the issue. Our cultural
richness and our nation's continued ability to remain competitive in the
global marketplace are directly related to the way we manage intellectual
capital. The systemic problems highlighted in this article place the federal
courts out of sync with the letter of the Copyright Act, as well as the pur-
pose of the Constitution's protections; therefore, the current approaches
cannot stand. Whether the work is delegated to Congress or to the court
system, it must be done to ensure that creative collaboration is profitable
for those who by their skill, labor, and ideas, are helping to progress
"science and the useful arts." The time has come to "up the irons."1 79
178. MEGADETH, ENDGAME (Roadrunner 2009).
179. The battle cry of Iron Maiden fans around the world. Roughly translated, it expresses the idea
that it is time to intensify one's focus and achieve something spectacular.
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